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EPILOGUE

The Dialectic of Idolatry and Profanation:
On Discerning the Spirit in Congregational Studies
Lois Malcolm

The contributors to this hook have sought, in concert with the Spirit of
God, to build up and empower congregations.1 What knowledge base,
skills, attitudes and beliefs, and behaviors do members of congregations
need in order to faithfully and effectively enact their identity as those who,
in the power of the Spirit, have been baptized into Jesus’ death and resur
rection (Rom. 6)? A key question in our deliberations has been how spiri
tual discernment might occur within the activity of theological reflection
on practices that constitute the life of a congregation.2 We have engaged a
1. On the burgeoning field of congregational studies, see Carl S. Dudley’s introduc
tion to “Giving Voice to Local Churches: New Congregational Studies,” The Christian Cen
tury (Aug. 12-19, 1992), 742-46. See also lames P. Wind and James W. Lewis, eds., American
Congregations, 2 vols. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994); Jackson W. Carroll,
Carl S. Dudley, and William McKinney, Handbook for Congregational Studies (Nashville:
Abingdon, 1986); Carl S. Dudley, Jackson W. Carroll, and Janies P Wind, eds., Carriers of
Tailh: Lessons front Congregational Studies (I.ouisville: Westminster John Knox, 1991); James
Hopewell, Congregations: Stories and Structures (Philadelphia: fortress, 1987). See, most re
cently, Matthew Guest, Karin 'lusting, and I.inda Woodhead, eds., Congregational Studies in
the UK: Christianity in a Post-Christian Context (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate Publishing Com
pany, 2004).
2. Practices are defined as those socially established patterns of human activity and
meaning that mediate between the personal and subjective, 011 the one hand, and the corpo
rate and objective, on the other. Oriented toward ends that inhere in the practices them
selves, they may not necessarily liave a product in addition to those internal ends. See David
Kelsey, 7b Understand Cod Truly: What's Theological About a Theological School (I.ouisville:
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range of disciplines in this effort, including congregational studies, theo
logical education, and practical theology, among others, in addition to the
classical fields of biblical, historical, and systematic theology. Nonetheless,
the focus of our attention has been on a single subject matter: the reality of
God. As members of the Congregational Studies Research Team, we have
approached our respective tasks in this project from the vantage point of
our own academic disciplines and distinct vocations as theological educa
tors. Yet we have all been focused on a singular task, that of spiritually dis
cerning truth within the presence of the Spirit of God. Our theological re
flection on congregations has found a shared locus in the activity of
spiritual discernment.
Our reflections in these essays have been organized around Bernard
Lonergan’s eight functional specialties.3 We have moved from descriptions
of congregational practices to initial understandings and assertions about
them, to judgments about these assertions, and finally to analyses of the
deeper dialectics uncovered in our conversations. This chapter focuses on
one of these core dialectics. It reflects on three approaches relevant to con
gregational studies from the fields of theological education'1 and practical
Westminster John Knox, 1992); see also Rebecca Chopp, Saving Work: Feminist Practices of
Theological Education (Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 1995). This focus on “practice”
can he contrasted with the attention given to “doctrine” in classical forms of Roman Catho
lic and Protestant orthodoxy and “experience” in modern liberal theologies. Compare Ed
ward Earley’s calls for a renewal of the classical concept of habitus in theological education,
the ethos that cultivates the soul’s dispositions and orientations in its knowledge of God,
which he spells out in The Fragility of Knowledge: Theological Education in the Church and
the University (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1988) and in his earlier Thcologia: The Fragmentation
and Unity of Theological Education (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1983). See also Francis Fiorcnza’s
discussion of the turn to practical reason in “Theological and Religious Studies: The Contest
of the Faculties,” in Barbara G. Wheeler and Edward Farley, eds., Shifting Boundaries: Con
textual Approaches to the Structure of Theological Education (Louisville: Westminster John
Knox, 1991), 119-50. Craig Dykstra describes the centrality of practices to congregational
studies in “Reconciling Practice,” in Wheeler and Farley, Shifting Boundaries, 35-66. This
turn to practice is reflected in a broader turn toward practical philosophy; see, e.g., HansGeorg Gadanier, Truth and Method (New York: Crossroad, 1982); Richard J. Bernstein, Praxis
anti Action (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1971); and Bernstein, Beyoitd
Objectivism anti Relativism: Science, Hermeneutics, and Praxis (Philadelphia: University of
Pennsylvania Press, 1983).
3. See Bernard l.onergan, Method in 'Theology (New York: Crossroad, 1972).
4. On the relationship between congregational studies and theological education, see
Joseph 1 lough, Jr., and Barbara (J. Wheeler, eds., Beyond Clericalism: The Congregation as a
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theology,*5 as represented by Don Browning, David Kelsey, and Rebecca
Chopp, with respect to the theological practices of two major twentiethcentury theologians: Karl Barth and Karl Rahner.61 use those two as exem
plars to illustrate how theological reflection as a critical exercise might be
rooted in basic Christian practices for understanding God truly. In partic
ular, I focus on the Reformation act of preaching and the Ignatian practice
of spiritual exercises. The fundamental dialectic I have uncovered in this
analysis is that of the Reformed critique of idolatry (the treatment of what
is profane as sacred) and the Roman Catholic critique of reductionism, or
what could be called profanation (the treatment of what is sacred as pro
fane).7 What I examine in this chapter is the relevance of this dialectic for
discerning the presence and activity of God’s Spirit within paradigmatic
practices of Christian faith that lie at the heart of a congregation’s moral
discourse and action.

The Problem and Context
Let us begin with an analysis of three theological approaches to the study
of congregations, approaches that correspond to broader movements in
theological education and practical theology. Don Browning’s A FundaFocus for Theological Education (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1988). For related discussions on
theological education, see Don Browning, David Polk, and Ian Evison, eds., The Education of
the Practical Theologian: llesponses to Joseph Hough and John Cobh’s “Christian Identity and
Theological Education" (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1989); Joseph Hough and John Cobb, Chris
tian Identity and Theological Education (Chico, CA: Scholars Press, 1985); Max Stackhouse,
Apologia: Contextualization, Globalization, and Mission in Theological Education (Grand
Rapids: Eerdmans, 1988); and Wheeler and Farley, Shifting Boundaries.
5. On the relationship between congregational studies and practical theology, see
Don S. Browning, “Congregational Studies as Practical Theology,” in Wind and Lewis, eds.,
American Congregations, vol. 2, New Perspectives in the Study of Congregations, 192-224. See
also Browning’s influential A Fundamental Practical Theology: Descriptive and Strategic Pro
posals (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1991). An exemplar of theological reflection with the congre
gation as a focus is Patrick Keifert’s Welcoming the Stranger: A Public Theology of Worship
and Evangelism (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1992).
6. See Lonergan, Method in Theology, chap. 10, “Dialectic.” In the analysis of these po
sitions, I have sought to follow in a general — if not a detailed fashion — Lonergan’s de
scription of the “structure” of a dialectic (see Method, 249ff.).
7. On the distinction between “idolatry” and “profanation,” see Paul Tillich, System
atic Theology, vol. 3 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963).
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mental Practical Theology is our first exemplar.8 His intent is explicitly to
relate the theological dimensions of congregational practices to their so
ciological, historical, psychological, and ethical dimensions.9 The distinc
tive thrust of his argument is to argue that theology as a whole should be
conceived as a “fundamental or critical practical theology.” Informed by
the turn to practical reason in hermeneutical and critical social theories,
he intends to reverse traditional models of theological education that be
gin with theories and then apply them to practice. Instead, he contends
that not only practical theology, but indeed all theology, needs to be con
ceived of as a fundamental, or critical, practical theology. Such a theology
has four movements: descriptive, historical, systematic, and strategic. And
a fundamental practical theology such as this begins with the practical
questions that emerge within congregational life as descriptive theology. It
then handles these questions more generally and critically as historical and
systematic theology, and finally allows these new insights to shed light on
concrete situations within congregations themselves as strategic practical
theology.
Browning notes the parallels between his position and David Tracy’s
proposal for a revisionist theology that critically correlates Christian wit
nesses with other interpretations of culture and experience.10 11
Nonetheless,
Browning contends that Tracy’s attempt to determine the transcendental
truth status of such a correlation obscures the practical character of all the
ology. Hence, Browning confines his correlation approach of validity
claims to more modest pragmatic, or hermeneutical, criteria. In a similar
vein, he criticizes confessional theologies such as Barth’s for simply apply
ing the theory of divine revelation to the practice of, say, giving sermons.
Our second exemplar is David Kelsey’s To Understand God Truly. In
this book Kelsey seeks to provide a framework for assessing and reshaping
the ethos and polity of theological schools.11 His goal is to identify not
only what unifies these schools, their construal of the Christian thing, but
to do justice to the pluralism of ways this Christian thing is construed. His
contention is that the diverse subject matters of theological schools are
best understood with respect to their place and role in the actual practices
8. Browning, zt Fundamental Practical Theology.
9- Note the five dimensions he includes in practical theology: the visional,
obligational, tendency-needs (or anthropological), environmental-social, and rule-role.
to. See David Tracy, Messed Page for Order (New York: Seabury, 1975).
11. David Kelsey, To Understand God Truly.
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of existing congregations. In his attempt to identify the Christian thing, he
rejects any essentialist construal that would limit it to an essence or struc
ture that remains the same in all times and spaces. Therefore, Kelsey shies
away from anything more substantive than a merely nominal depiction of
Christian congregations. He defines them merely as that “group of persons
that gathers together to enact publicly a much more broadly practiced
worship of God in Jesus’ name.”12 Such a nominal approach can best be
described as “cultural-linguistic,” because it defines its criterion for Chris
tian identity primarily in terms of the linguistic practices of congrega
tions.13
Our third exemplar is Rebecca Chopp’s Saving Work: Feminist Prac
tices in Theological Education, in which she reflects on feminist practices in
theological education. In an analysis of the presence of women in theologi
cal education and the current state of feminist theological scholarship, she
highlights the importance of feminist practices to theological education by
describing three practices: (a) narrativity, how women compose or write
new narratives for their lives; (b) ecclesiality, how women have attempted to
reconstruct ecclesial practices; and (c) feminist theology, how women are
reconstructing theology along feminist lines. She traces how such practices
deconstruct patriarchal forms of theology and reconstruct Christian theol
ogy in a feminist vein. That reconstruction is informed by a range of femi
nist values, such as “particularity,” “embodiment,” “creativity,” “mutuality,”
“friendship,” “justice,” and so on. Like Browning, Chopp is critical of tradi
tional notions of divine transcendence. In her early work, she rejects Tracy’s
transcendental correlation approach in favor of what she calls a “praxis cor
relation.”14 In Saving Work she rejects a traditional notion of divine tran
scendence, identifying it with a patriarchal emphasis on separation and de
tachment. Instead, she emphasizes the importance of connectedness and
embodiment, not only in relationships among human beings, but also for
speaking about God’s relationship with human beings. She does speak of
the importance of openness, but her emphasis is on openness to diversity
and difference among human beings.
These three approaches differ in how they identify the central truth
12. Kelsey, To Ullderstniitl (toil Truly, 137.
13. Cf. George Lindbcck, The Nature oj Doctrine (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1992).
14. Rebecca Chopp, “Practical Theology and Liberation,” in Lewis Mudge and lames
Poling, eds., Torination anti Reflection (Philadelphia: Portress, 1987"), 120-38.
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and meaning of Christian theology. For Kelsey, it is the practices per
formed in the name of Jesus that constitute the Christian identity of con
gregations and theological schools. For Browning, it is the critical correla
tion of the range of validity claims — metaphysical, normative, natural,
social, and ecological — that emerge in the study of congregations. For
Chopp, it is the feminist praxis that transforms patriarchal Christianity.
However, we can note three points of similarity among these posi
tions. First, all three accept such modern notions of historical conscious
ness and a nonteleological view of the natural world. They are not advo
cating a return to premodern Christian orthodoxies. Second, all three
advocate the turn to practical reasoning characteristic of much post
modern thought: they all recognize a deep interconnection between ratio
nality and such factors as commitment, desire, and shared systems of belief
and practice. Finally, all three are critical of traditional theological con
cepts of divine transcendence or philosophical forms of transcendental ar
gumentation. This is the case whether they are conceived of in essentialist
terms (Kelsey), in confessionalist or transcendental and metaphysical
terms (Browning), or in the patriarchal terms of detachment and separa
tion (Chopp).
Instead, Kelsey opts for a nominal criterion for truth: the name of Je
sus. Browning and Chopp opt for pragmatic criteria: what enables human
life to flourish. Such criteria enable these theologians to criticize some dis
tortions in classical theology: (a) the reduction of what is distinctively
Christian to a universal essence within human experience (Kelsey); (b) the
reduction of concrete practices to theoretical abstractions (Browning); and
(c) the reduction of Christianity to a patriarchal religion (Chopp). These
criteria, in turn, enable them to criticize possible distortions of each other’s
positions. Kelsey might detect an essentialism in Browning; Browning
might detect a narrow confessionalism in Kelsey; Chopp might detect
patriarchialism in both Browning and Kelsey, and they, in turn, might de
tect a tendency by Chopp to reduce Christian faith to the concerns of a par
ticular cause or movement.
The criticisms these positions offer each other can be situated within
the long tradition of rational criticisms of distorted religion. These extend
from Heraclitus’s and Plato’s critique of ancient Greek beliefs to Kant’s and
Flume’s critiques of classical theism, to the later critiques of Christianity by
Marx, Freud, Feuerbach, and Nietzsche. Nonetheless, in addition to these ra
tional criticisms there have also been, throughout the history of both Juda-
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ism and Christianity, distinctively theological forms of critique: these are the
prophetic and the mystical.'5 Prophetic critique is identified with the Old
Testament prophets, some of the movements of inonasticism, the Reforma
tion, and evangelical radicalism. This kind of critique attacks the sin of idol
atry, what I have identified above as the sin of treating as sacred or divine
that which is profane or mundane. By contrast, the mystical critique within
Christianity negates any form of profanation, what I have identified as the
sin of treating as profane or mundane that which is sacred. This is found
among patristic and medieval theologians. These two sins can be thought of
as constituting the polarity of methods for understanding God truly.
In my analysis of Barth and Rahner,16 I will show how these two
forms of critique mutually test each other’s theological distortions — each
other’s possible sin.17 And yet, each form of critique is rooted in the same
15. See David Tracy’s use of the contrast between the “mystical” and “prophetic” in
Dialogue with the Other: The Inter-Religious Dialogue (Louvain: Peeters Press; Grand Rapids:
Eerdmans, 1990); see also his earlier contrast between “manifestation” and “proclamation”
in Analogical Imagination: Christian Theology and the Culture of Pluralism (New York:
Crossroad, 1987). See also Paul Tillich’s contrast between the prophetic and mystical in Sys
tematic Theology, vol. 1 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951), 8tff., 172ft.
16. For another study that examines how Barth and Rahner might contribute to a
conception of “critical theology,” see Gareth Jones, Critical Theology: Questions of Truth and
Method (New York: Paragon House, 1995). His argument is compatible with the one I am
making in this chapter. On the question of a “critical theology,” note the following comment
by Hugh T. Kerr in his essay “Time for a Critical Theology”: “A critical theology, taking seri
ously the revelatory dimension of the gospel, could be our best safeguard against selling out
completely to a 'religionless Christianity’ which is no more distinguishable from secular hu
manism” (Our Life in God’s Light: Essays by Hugh T. Kerr, ed. J. M. Mulder [Philadelphia:
Fortress, 1979], 60, quoted in Gareth Jones, Critical Theology, 6, n. 7). But note also Kerr’s
comment on “critical theology”: “It is perhaps not unduly summary to say that this means
systematic theology (a rarely practiced inquiry in the ancient English universities) is critical
of its own grounds and disturbing to the faithful (a rare phenomenon in confessional insti
tutions). The task of the critical theologian in this sense is — or would be — to reflect, theo
retically and critically, upon the first-order levels of more or less spontaneous religious (in
this sense Christian) existence as they are found in symbolic, linguistic, and institutional
forms” (in Kerr’s review of Nicholas I.ash’s “Doing Theology on Dover Beach,” New
lllackfriars 60 [1979]: 237; quoted in Jones, Critical Theology, 6, 11. 6).
17. This critique will be related to their respective notions of “hiddenness” (Barth)
and “incomprehensibility” (Rahner). On the theological concept of “hiddenness,” see B. A.
Gerrish, “To the Unknown God: Luther and Calvin on the Hiddenness of God,” Journal of
Religion (1973): 263-93. For Rahner’s definition of “incomprehensibility,” see “Thomas Aqui
nas on the Incomprehensible God,” in David Tracy, ed., Celebrating the Medieval Heritage: A
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theological criterion, which is the God known by Christians as the God re
vealed in Jesus Christ by the power of the Holy Spirit.*
18

An Appropriation of Karl Barth’s and Karl Rahner’s Theologies

In the prolegomenon to his Church Dogmatics, Barth contends that the
task of dogmatics is to test the proclamation of the church against the be
ing of the church, the revealing and reconciling address of God in Jesus
Christ.19 His theological method is rooted in the core act of Reformation
piety, which is the preaching of the Word that sanctifies and justifies and
that leads to obedience and self-denial. Barth’s theology criticizes both a
Protestant liberalism that locates the criterion for Christian theology in a
more general ontology or anthropology and a Roman Catholicism that
judges Christian theology in terms of the infallible teaching of the church.
For Barth, theology’s task is to test church proclamation against the crite
rion of the revelation of God. This revelation is given in a free divine act,
rather than being the result of any human possibility or necessity. None
theless, this task is inherently difficult. In preaching, God’s speech and ac
tion is only indirectly expressed in the two direct forms, proclamation and
Scripture, forms that are in and of themselves human and not divine.
Hence we encounter the challenge of dogmatics: how to discern God’s
speech and action when it is only found in a human form.
Colloquy on the Thought of Aquinas ami Bonavenlttre, Journal of Religion Supplement
(1978): S107-26. For an appropriation of Karl Barth’s concept of hiddenness, see F.berhard
Jiingel, Gad as the Mystery of the World: Oil the Foundation of the Theology of the Crucified
One in the Dispute between Theism and Atheism, trans. Itarrell L. Guder (Grand Rapids:
F.erdmans, 1983).
18. Note Lonergan’s perceptive comment: “It is to be observed that while for secular
man of the twentieth century the most familiar differentiation of consciousness distin
guishes and relates theory and common sense, still in the history of mankind both in the East
and the Christian West the predominant differentiation of consciousness has set in opposi
tion and in mutual enrichment the realms of common sense and of transcendence" (Method
in Theology, 266; italics added). The thrust of my argument in this chapter is for the central
ity of the latter differentiation of consciousness (between common sense and transcen
dence) to theological reflection without negating the importance of the former differentia
tion (between theory and common sense).
19. See Karl Iiarth, Church Dogmatics, vols. 1-4, ed. G. W. Bromiley and T. F. Torrance
(Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1936-77).
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Barth understands God’s hiddenness in revelation. Thus, God’s
speech and action is always, on the one hand, a law that judges all human
pretensions and projections onto divinity; on the other hand, God’s
speech and action is expressed in concrete human forms. These include the
humanity of Jesus, the preaching that gives witness to that humanity, the
church in which that preaching occurs, and so forth. These forms tangibly
articulate the gospel, God’s revelation and salvation. Preaching repeats the
Word of God in the here and now; it recollects and expects Jesus’ death and
resurrection. The sacramental reality at the heart of time is God’s election
of Jesus Christ, an election that culminates in his life, death, and resurrec
tion. It is this life, death, and resurrection that, by the power of Jesus’ res
urrected Spirit, is repeated in the church’s recollection and expectation of
its eschatological and cosmic implications. These are always simulta
neously past, present, and future. The theologian’s task is patterned after
that of an exegete and preacher committed to the hearing and doing of the
Word. In this regard, Barth explicitly links his hermeneutical method with
a Law/Gospel dialectic that actually speaks of God’s judgment and mercy.
The theological task must be an act of prayer and of gratitude, an act of re
sponse to a divine address, both there and then and here and now.
Rahner’s theology, by contrast, is deeply informed by the Ignatian ex
ercises and the act of discerning divine will and presence in the concrete
and ordinary circumstances of life.20 At the heart of his work is a depiction
of the divine-human encounter as a dialogue in which human beings are
understood to have an ecstatic or transcendent movement beyond strictly
empirical experience. This orientation or openness toward the divine is
radicalized by grace in such a way that humans do not experience God
merely as the infinitely distant Other, but they also experience God as im
mediate and attainable. God can be apprehended, as in the beatific vision,
in loving ecstasy and rapture. The task of theology entails depicting this
fundamental encounter philosophically. It entails presenting the funda
mental teachings or mysteries of the faith theologically so that they render
an encounter with the divine and not merely a teaching of church tradi
tion. Finally, it entails describing existentially the process whereby human
20. Karl Rahner, Foundations of Christian Faith: An Introduction to the Idea of Chris
tianity (New York: Crossroad, 1987); Theological Investigations, vols. 1-6 (Baltimore: Helicon
Press, 1961-69); vols. 7-10 (New York: Herder and Herder, 1971-74); vols. 11-16 (New York:
Seabury Press, 1974-79); vols. 17-23 (New York: Crossroad, 1981-92).
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beings may surrender themselves unconditionally to the abiding presence
of mystery in the concrete circumstances and decisions of their lives. But
these tasks arc fraught with a problematic similar to that of Barth’s dog
matics. How can divine and infinite reality be said to be present within hu
man forms that are always conditioned by finitude, realities such as space,
time, history, and language?
Rahner understands God’s incomprehensibility in self-communication
to speak of the way God is experienced in one’s abstraction from concrete
particulars. Such abstraction, in turn, leads to the categorical experience of
God in concrete experiences and thoughts, the finding of God in all things,
and the mediated immediacy of God’s presence in all reality. Explicit and
more frequently implicit acts of prayer, for Rahner, enact the dynamism
whereby God’s offer of grace is accepted. We find this, for example, when
decisions are made between good and evil, right and wrong in light of a
conception of absolute truth or absolute good. For Rahner, the center of
human and cosmic history is also Christological: that is, it is defined in terms
of Jesus’ incarnation, where the divine became human. All human actions
and thoughts — and within them, all history — find their telos, their true
meaning and purpose, from the incarnation. Rahner’s mode of theological
reflection is patterned after that of the person who leads others in con
templation and action, through an attitude of indifference toward all things
so that one can then find God in all things. His very concept of the inter
pretation of doctrine is that it is such a person that leads one to an actual
encounter with abiding mystery. The goal of interpretation is to lead one
to see how the innumerable beliefs within Christianity actually have to do
with the mystery of God’s self-communication.
These two theologies offer criticisms of the potential distortions in
each other’s positions. Rahner’s fear is that a position like Barth’s fails to
grasp what lies at the heart of God’s incomprehensibility, which is the very
inexhaustibility and limitlessness of God’s own life. This is a mystery that
cannot be reduced to the finite expressions of revelation or grace, even
though these serve as the very grammar of divine self-expression. Rahner
wants to emphasize the fact that it is always God, and therefore uncreated
grace, who is present in the experience of Jesus and the Holy Spirit. He
stresses this even though this experience is always mediated by the finite
person experiencing it. This leads him to criticize all forms of positivism,
which can include a metaphysical ontologism, a biblical and dogmatic
extrinsicism, or a scientific positivism that denies the sacred presence of
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God in all finite reality. The key to Rahner’s criticism lies in his critique of
distortions concerning God’s revelation or the experience of grace. He is
concerned that God not be viewed as simply another agent, even if the
largest agent, among human agents.
Barth’s fear would be that Rahner fails to grasp the particular charac
ter of God’s mystery as address: this is the election of Jesus Christ and his
life, death, and resurrection, and the church’s distinctive witness to it. For
Barth, God’s hiddenness even in this revelation entails that God cannot be
circumscribed in ways that comprehend God’s free act, as though this
event could be circumscribed within human existence. He criticizes all
forms of the analogy of being — whether of a liberal or Roman Catholic
variety — that would reduce the free act of God’s revelation to a category
of being or subjectivity. The force of Barth’s criticism lies in the critique of
distortions that would treat the free act of God as yet another realization of
a possibility within human existence.
What is at stake in the contrast between Barth and Rahner? Is it that
Barth is a revelational positivist? Does he disallow human autonomy, the
full knowledge and experience of God, or any possibility of a sacramental
presence of God in the world or the church, and so on?21 Is it, in turn, that
Rahner is an experiential expressivist? Does he not do justice to either the
mystery of God or the concrete media that mediate the church’s witness to
the distinctive life, death, and resurrection of Jesus Christ?22
Where Barth and Rahner differ is over what each considers to be the
central distortion of faith. For Barth, the central distortion is any false
identification of some aspect of human experience — nature, reason, or
history — with the knowledge and experience of God. This distortion
presents the danger of being an idolatry that would sacralize some finite
reality and absolutize it. By contrast, Rahner’s idea of the central distortion
21. Barth has often been depicted as a “revelational positivist” who fails to deal ade
quately witli human experience, botli inside and outside the church, by subsuming all reality
within the single act of God’s election of Jesus Christ. For the first use of this phrase, see
Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Letters from Prison, ed. Eherhard Bethge (New York: Macmillan Co.,
1971), 28.
22. Rahner has been depicted as an “experiential expressivist” who fails to deal ade
quately with not only linguistic and cultural experience and natural constraints, but most
importantly with what is distinctive to the Christian ecclesial experience and its witness to
the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus Christ. For the first use of this phrase, see George
I.indbeck, The Nature of Doctrine.
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is not a false identification with the divine, but the negation of divine pres
ence.23 What he criticizes is not false spirituality but a false secularism.
This is the case whether it takes an ecclesial or a humanist-scientific form,
any form that fails to perceive God’s sacred presence in all reality. For
Rahner, the central theological distortion is the profanation that negates or
refuses to recognize the presence of the sacred in all things, including one’s
own and others’ agency and power.

A Critical Conversation with Congregational Studies

What relevance does this excursus on Barth and Rahner have for congrega
tional studies? These two figures are relevant because they appropriate
classical notions of hiddenness and incomprehensibility in ways that enact
the presence and mystery of God in the actual practices of congregations.
Such practices include listening to and appropriating sermons and Bible
reading, and discerning God’s will in specific choices on issues. Practical
theology, along with its subdisciplines of theological education and con
gregational studies, has made important strides in rethinking how theo
logical reflection might be done, given both modern and postmodern
shifts in thinking. Nonetheless, the concern with what is distinctively theo
logical in these fields of study could be intensified. Seeking to address this
concern in this section, I set Barth and Rahner in critical conversation with
Browning, Kelsey, and Chopp, the three exemplars of current thinking in
theological education and practical theology.
Browning’s central contribution to the study of congregations is his
comprehensiveness. His fundamental practical theology has within its
purview the whole range of goods, needs, and desires that constitute hu
man and creaturely existence before God. He offers in this an antidote to a
linguistic positivism that would reduce the totality of human existence to
23. Note the similarities between Karl Rahner’s notion of sin and that of Lonergan:
“Sinfulness similarly is distinct from moral evil; it is the privation of total loving; it is the
radical dimension of lovelessness. That dimension can be hidden by sustained superficiality,
by evading ultimate questions, by absorption in all that the world offers to challenge our re
sourcefulness, to relax our bodies, to distract our minds. But escape may not be permanent
and then the absence of fulfillment reveals itself in unrest, the absence of joy in the pursuit
of fun, the absence of peace in disgust — a depressive disgust with oneself or a manic, hos
tile, even violent disgust with mankind” (Method in Theology, 242-43).
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specific cultural expressions, to particular forms of Christian identity.
Nonetheless, Barth’s notion of hiddenness brings to the fore a possible
danger in this position. It might subordinate Christian theology to criteria
derived from other disciplines and thereby commit the idolatry of estab
lishing an external vantage point from which to view God’s self-revelation.
An antidote to such a distortion may be found in Rahner’s understanding
of the radical depth and irreducibility of divine incomprehensibility. The
depth and irreducibility is, in fact, the condition for the possibility of all
creaturely existence and all human knowing.
Kelsey’s central contribution to congregational studies is his focus on
the constitutive role the name of Jesus has for defining what is Christian in
the practices of congregations. He offers an antidote to an experiential
expressivism that would de-emphasize linguistic practices that constitute
Christian congregations as Christian in favor of transcendental experi
ences of God. But Rahner’s concept of incomprehensibility brings to the
fore a possible distortion in Kelsey’s position, the reducing of the Christian
thing to a nominal — in Rahner’s term, “extrinsicist”— conception of di
vine presence. As an antidote, we can recall Barth’s emphasis that it is fi
nally the resurrected Spirit of Jesus who is disclosed in the preaching and
teaching of the church, the Spirit who is present precisely as the ascended
Lord in that proclamation.
Chopp’s argument for the importance of feminist practices in theo
logical reflection is a definite critique of all forms of patriarchalism in
Christian theology. But she also offers the corrective of emphasizing the
centrality of concrete human experiences and movements that are taking
place in our time. And yet, from a Barthian standpoint, the danger in her
position is that it tends to blur the distinction between God’s Word as an
address from the Other and one’s own particular experience of salvation
or liberation. Once again, Rahner’s concept of incomprehensibility pro
vides a way of thinking about God as the abiding presence that is tangibly
present within all human activity. This is true especially in human experi
ences of liberation, even though this presence cannot be reduced to any
particular thought or action or experience of liberation.24
24. Having outlined these insights from Barth and Rahner, I should also comment
on how the emphases of our three contemporary thinkers offer correctives to their work.
We have noted Kelsey’s focus on cultural-linguistic practices, Browning’s integration of a
range of specific dimensions of human experience, and Chopp’s focus on women’s experi-
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On the basis of this critical conversation, I offer three insights for an
interdisciplinary approach to understanding God truly in congregations.25
These insights revolve around the threefold task of how Christians might:
(1) test the spirits in moral conversation and action; (2) reflect on that lived
practice; and (3) understand how God is active in both activities.26
The first task involves testing the spirits in conversation and action,
following our reading of Browning, this entails placing within the com
pass of theological reflection the totality of creaturely existence, including
the metaphysical and religious, the social and linguistic, and the biological.
It is especially important that theological reflection encompasses the
whole of human existence in our highly complex, differentiated modern
These three emphases indicate a strong trend in recent theology toward the concrete
and particular in human experience. Barth and Rahner have been criticized for their lack of
attention to concrete human history and experience: Barth for collapsing all creaturely ex
istence (historical and natural) into the figure of Christ, and Rahner for collapsing all real
ity, including biblical history and public human history, into the creature’s dynamism to
ward transcendence. See, e.g., Kendall Soulen’s critique of Barth and Rahner in 'l'hc God of
Israel mid Christian Theology (Minneapolis: fortress, 1996). Among Protestants influenced
by Barth, Wolfhart Pannenberg has placed a greater focus on human rationality, human
history in general, and the proleptic expectation of the future. Sec, e.g., his Systematic The
ology, vol. 1, trans. Geoffrey W. Bromilcy (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1988). Eherhard Jiingel
places greater focus on the death and resurrection of Jesus as the locus for naming God’s
identity; see Jiingel, Gotl as Mystery of the World, finally, Jurgen Moltinann has emphasized
both the cross and human creaturely freedom within history; see, e.g., The Crucified Gotl:
The Cross of Christ as the Foundation and Criticism of Christian Theology, trans. R. 11. Wil
son and John Bowden (San francisco: Harper & Row, 1974). Within Roman Catholicism,
Johann Baptist Metz has emphasized similar themes, giving greater attention to the future
and to the suffering of Jesus and human beings in general within history; see Faith in His
tory anti Society: Toward a Practical Fundamental Theology (New York: Seabury, 1980). I Jans
Urs von Balthasar, in turn, places greater emphasis on the death and resurrection of Jesus
and the centrality of that event within the life of God; sec The Glory of the Ford: A Theo
logical Aesthetics, 3 vols. (San francisco: Ignatius Press, 1983-88), and Thcodramatik (Einsiedeln: Johannes-Verlag, 1973-83)25. I also develop some of these themes in another paper, entitled “Cultivating Wis
dom in a Complex World,” in L. Gregory Jones and Stephanie Paulsell, eds., The Vocation of
the 'Theological Teacher (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2001).
26. My analysis follows the threefold pattern William Schweiker outlines in his essay
“Beyond the Captivity of Theology: Toward a New Theology of Culture,” presented at the
American Academy of Religion, Nov. 2000: (1) socio-cultural analysis; (2) conceptuallinguistic articulation; and (3) religio-moral attestation. See also his Power, Value and Con
viction: Theological Tillies in the Postmodern Age (Cleveland: Pilgrim Press, 1998).
dice.
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societies. In these societies we have multiple subsystems that are reflexive,
that is, they act on and are affected by each other. In such societies, each
social system, such as the law or the economy, must adapt itself as it inter
acts with information coming from other domains.27 But how can one
speak about this differentiation and still speak about God and thus the
whole of one’s existence? Following Luther and Calvin, the Reformation
practice of preaching, with its reading, exegeting, and appropriating Scrip
ture, cannot be divorced from the activity of enacting one’s vocation. What
is the meaning of “vocation” in classical Reformation theologies? It is the
institutionally embodied expression of how individuals and groups might
enact God’s purposes in all of life, including the family, the government,
and the church. In a similar vein, the Catholic practice of discerning the
spirits presupposes a differentiated and hierarchical conception of human
goods or ends. What does this conception of human goods or ends entail?
It entails that human beings have a natural right to self-preservation even
as they participate in a common social good.
Both sets of theological resources — that of a Reformation under
standing of vocation or a Roman Catholic understanding of differentiated
goods — presuppose God’s presence and activity. In the former, the norms
and purposes of life are rooted in patterns of interaction founded ulti
mately on God’s fidelity to creation. In the latter, the natural ends of hu
mans flourishing as individuals and in communities serve supernatural
ends. These two legacies offer complex symbolic and conceptual resources
for thinking about how we might order our lives as individuals, families,
and congregations. More important, they offer resources for thinking
about how Christian communities arc indeed “ecumenical, worldly forces
that can and may and must counterbalance [even] transnational, global
agents.”28
The second task involves reflecting on particular lived practices. Fol
lowing our reading of Kelsey, this entails naming within the concrete prac
tices and face-to-face encounters of Christian communities precisely what
27. See John Tomlinson, Globalization and Culture (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1999), and Roland Robertson, Globalization: Social Theory and Global Culture (London:
SAGE Publications, 1992). See also William Schwciker, “Beyond the Captivity of Theology.”
28. See William Schweiker’s discussion of these two legacies in “Responsibility in the
World ot Mammon,” in Max I.. Stackhouse and Peter J. Paris, eds., God and Globalization,
vol. i ol Religion and the Powers of the Common Life (Harrisburg, PA: Trinity Press Interna
tional, 2000), 105-39.
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the God who raised Israel’s Jesus from the dead would have us be and do
(Rom. 12:1-2).29 Precisely how is this God working all things together for
good, not only in our lives but in the world as a whole, even when there
may appear to be strong evidence to the contrary (Rom. 8:28)?
This is precisely why Christians exegete and appropriate Christian
Scripture. They want to seek to discern God’s will for their lives as they
read and meditate on these texts. One can contrast the Reformation prac
tice of preaching and exegeting the Word with the Roman Catholic prac
tice of discerning the spirits. Nevertheless, these practices have a similar
purpose. They both provide believers with a means for seeing and hearing
how their lives are indeed affected by the historic and cosmic implications
of Jesus’ deatli and resurrection. Therefore, in these practices the task of
interpreting the Bible is not simply that of repristinating the meanings of
these ancient texts; nor is the task simply to find some singular essence that
these texts were really intending.30
Rather, the purpose of these practices is to read the biblical texts in
ductively in their full complexity, as actual genres and actual traditions in
their original settings in life.31 Such an approach means reading these texts
not only in their original settings in life but also in the range of ways they
have been interpreted over time. Such a task will involve rethinking many
of our highly abstract, commonsense notions of how God is active in the
world in light of the rich and complex relationships among the pluralistic
witnesses of Scripture.32 And such rethinking will mean taking seriously
the distinct ways God’s presence and activity is actually depicted in biblical
descriptions of creation, Jesus’ life, death, and resurrection, and the ongo
ing presence of the Spirit.33 The result of such rethinking is an even richer
29. See Robert Jenson’s focus on the Trinity in Christian Dogmatics, vol. 1, ed. Carl
Braaten and Robert Jenson (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1984).
30. See Paul Ricoeur, Figuring the Sacred: Religion, Narrative and Imagination (Min
neapolis: Fortress, 1995). See also Ronald Duty’s essay entitled “Discerning the Will of God,”
in this volume.
31. Thus the historical and literary criticism of biblical texts has been an important
part of the use of Scripture in this study of congregations. See, e.g., David Fredrickson’s es
say in this volume.
32. See Michael Welker, “Christian Theology: What Direction at the End of the Sec
ond Millennium?” in Miroslav Volf, Carmen Krieg, and Thomas Kucharz, eds., The Future of
Theology: Essays in Honor of Jurgen Moltmann (Grand Rapid: Eerdmans, 1996), 73-88.
33. See Welker’s reference to John Polkinghorne (The Faith of a Physicist: Reflections of
a Bottom-up Thinker [Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994], 4) in his essay
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understanding of God’s power and wisdom — and the creative freedom of
creatures. It also entails correcting distorted ways of thinking and speaking
about God and God’s relationship to the world. This enables humans to
appreciate and experience more fully the “real joy in God’s vitality, genu
ine fear of God, and the vitality of human experiences of God.”34
The third task involves discerning how God is active and present in
life. Following our reading of Chopp, this entails discerning and respond
ing to what God is doing in concrete, particular circumstances. As I have
noted above, the very complexity of highly differentiated modern societies
entails reflexivity: different domains act on each other and affect each
other reflexively. This means, for example, that the mass media, the econ
omy, and what is identified as the spiritual are in a very real way pro
foundly linked. As human agents, we cannot divorce ourselves from this
reflexivity.35 Indeed, to function in such a complex society, we need to have
a high level of self-reflexivity. This is required even though we may find
ourselves thinking, feeling, and acting amid circumstances in which we do
not feel like individuals who have much control over such matters.36 But
for Christians the purpose of such reflexivity cannot simply be about selfmastery or achieving one’s purposes in the midst of a rapidly changing
and sometimes chaotic world. The purpose is to discern how best to par
ticipate in God’s justice and mercy in this world.
We have been baptized in Christ’s death, and thus have “died to sin.”
This means that we, too, like Christ, might be “raised from the dead by the
glory of the Father, so that we might walk in newness of life” (Rom. 6:4).
Partly at issue here is dying to being self-centered in an individualistic
sense, of seeing only our own ends and not the broader sweep of things.
But also at issue is how we participate in systems, such as the economic,

“Christian Theology,” 78. Following Polkinghorne’s observation in the Gifford Lectures of
1993-94 that “many theologians are instinctively top-down thinkers,” Welker suggests an in
ductive “bottom-up” reading of Scripture.
34. Welker, “Christian Theology,” 75.
35. Note the ongoing relevance of Lonergan’s perceptive analysis of reflexivity; see
esp. his discussion of Bruno Snell's The Discovery of the Mimi (e.g., in Method hi Theology,
26off.). For an insightful discussion of “spiritual reflexivity” from a sociological perspective,
see Wade Clark Roof, Spiritual Marketplace: liaby Boomers ami the Remaking of American
Religion (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999).
36. See, e.g., Peter Senger, The Tiflh Discipline: The Art anil Practice of the Learning Or
ganization (New York: Doubleday, 1990).
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political, and cultural systems in which we find ourselves. We use these sys
tems to pursue particular interests, many of which are incompatible with
God’s reign of truth and justice, as is evident in Romans 8:38-39: here is a
list of things we might fear would separate us from God’s love.37 But in the
final analysis, it is not critique and death that we are about — but life. The
purpose of testing our biases and distortions is for us to perceive the rich
density of God’s goodness in the very webs of interconnectedness we find
ourselves in, whether on an interpersonal or institutional level.38
In the words of Francois Roustang, a modern Jesuit spiritual writer:
“To discern God’s will, our first care must be to let things and beings as
sume their own value and their own weight, to thrust aside previous im
pressions and to welcome as a living reality this world in which God is at
work.”39 40
This requires spiritual discernment, what St. Paul calls the “wis
dom of God”: it is allowing the Spirit, who searches all things, to reveal to
us the “deep things of God,” the “mind of Christ.”10 Such intelligence is not
measured by scholastic aptitude tests; rather, it lives out of the truth of the
future. This future is entailed in the promise that all things will indeed
work together for good and that nothing can separate us from God’s love
in Christ Jesus (Rom. 8). But such discernment also respects the past: it
recognizes how the present is constituted by previous situations, events,
relationships, acts, and thoughts. Of course, this past derives its value from
the future that God is preparing for us. Nonetheless, the future can also be
a dangerous myth if it does not accept the past, and if it does not fully rec
ognize where and what things really are in the present.
Thus the spiritual cannot be divorced from the cognitive in congre
gational studies. Spiritual or theological wisdom (sapienlia) must em
brace the other disciplines in the study of congregations (scientia), such
as history, the social sciences, education, and so on.41 We must not aban37. Welker makes this point in “Christian Theology,” 84-86,
38. Lonergan’s very helpful discussion of biases and distortions in theological reflec
tion should not be overlooked. See Method in Theology, esp. chap, to on “Dialectic” and
chap. 11 on “foundations.” Iris Murdoch is also helpful on this; see, e.g., Metaphysics ns 11
Guide to Morals (London: Penguin, 1992).
19. Francois Roustang, S.J., Growth in the Spirit, trans. Kathleen Pond (New York:

Sliced & Ward, 1966), 141.
40. On the “mind of Christ” in Phil. 2, see David Frederickson’s essay in this volume.
41. Again, l.onergan is helpful on the relationship between the “sapiential” and the
“cognitive,” or, to use his categories, intellectual, moral, and religious conversion. “I would
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don empirical description and rational analysis, for they have a role in
our fully understanding the entanglements of our lives: to whom we com
mit ourselves, what we buy, how we vote, how we spend our time — the
basic attitudes, beliefs, and values we allow to influence our perception of
the world. These are precisely the places where we experience the beauty
and goodness of God’s creation, the reality of sin and tragedy, and the
healing and forgiving power of Jesus’ resurrection and the new creation it
entails.
The specific form such discernment takes will vary. The complexity
of the biblical texts themselves, and their rich diversity of genres, is testi
mony to that variety. Note the range of these texts, from the wisdom that
accounts for the best in nature and human intelligence (Prov. 8) to the
folly of the cross that confounds the wise and the debaters of the age
(i Cor. 1:20-25). In this chapter I have focused on the dialectic that these
two classical forms of wisdom represent. We have seen these in Rahner’s
depiction of grace and Barth’s depiction of the gospel. We have also noted
the two distortions, or forms of sin, that they wish to reject. But this analy
sis has not simply focused on critique. The point of the dialectic we have
analyzed is to assist congregations in discerning how God is at work in,
with, and under the reality of our lives. The point is to enable us to discern
when and how God’s goodness is being replaced by some idolatrous effort
to be God, and when and how to enact God’s justice and mercy in the often
messy complexity of life.42

use [the notion of ‘sublation’) in Karl Rahner’s sense rather than Hegel’s to mean that what
sublates goes beyond what is sublated, introduces something new and distinct, puts every
thing on a new basis, yet so far from interfering with the sublated or destroying it, on the
contrary needs it, includes it, preserves all its proper features and properties, and carries
them forward to a fuller realization within a richer context” (Method in Theology, 241).
42. Cf. Michael Welker’s comment about “realistic theology” in God the Spirit (Min
neapolis: Fortress, 1994), xi: “Many theologies grounded in human experiences and forms of
experience need to take as their points of departure both actual demonstrations of God’s
power within creation and people’s search for God in the realm of that which is creaturely.
This is true whether the orientation of such theologies be empirical, pietistic, moral,
epistemological-philosophical, or otherwise. A realistic theology mediates this need of the
ologies grounded in human experience with the concern of classical, Reformation, and dia
lectical theologies ‘from above’ to take God’s divinity seriously and not to obstruct enjoy
ment of the fullness and glory of God.”
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Conclusion

In summary, throughout these discussions of congregations we have been
arguing that God can only be understood indirectly. God is always both
hidden and revealed in the church’s proclamation (cf. Barth); God’s mys
tery and incomprehensibility remain even as we come to know and love
God more deeply (cf. Rahner). Nonetheless, as Christians we affirm that
God has revealed who God is in the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus.
By the power of the Spirit, we have been called and sent to tangibly attend,
assert, decide, and act on this within the totality of our lives. But that
means that we must risk thinking and speaking about God, and thus we
risk the sins of either idolatry or profanation.
Within Protestantism, the main fear has been of the danger of idola
try. If anything, modern culture has sought to base its public life on what is
universal, objective, and abstract, and not on what is sectarian. Indeed, one
could argue that the Enlightenment critique of particular religions could
be seen as a secularized version of this Protestant critique.43 The Congre
gational Study Research Team has presupposed that the finite is capable of
bearing the infinite: this means that the worldly and mundane can indeed
embody God’s presence. What I have argued for here is an appropriate bal
ance of this polarity. Of course, in addition to the danger of idolatry, there
is also the danger of profanation. Therefore, what I have offered by way of
a comparison of Barth and Rahner is an analysis of precisely this dialectic
and how it might function in the discerning of God’s presence in actual
congregational practices.

43. Immanuel Kant, The Critique of Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone (Cam
bridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1999), would be the paradigmatic exemplar of this.
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